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Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Secretary of Labor is 
authorized to issue whatever standards are “reasonably necessary or appropriate” to 
provide safe or healthful places of employment. More than any other provision in federal 
regulatory law, this language is subject to a plausible nondelegation challenge, because it 
seems to ask the Secretary to choose among a wide array of “intelligible principles” for 
standard-setting. The constitutional challenge raises serious and unresolved questions for 
both regulatory policy and administrative law. In answering those questions, courts have 
three principal alternatives. The most aggressive approach would be to invalidate the 
statute in the hopes of encouraging, for the first time, sustained legislative deliberation 
about the proper content of occupational safety and health policy. The most modest 
approach, rooted in the Avoidance Canon, would be to construe the statutory language to 
produce floors and ceilings on agency action; that approach would require the Secretary 
to ban significant risks while forbidding the Secretary from regulating trivial or de 
minimis risks and also requiring the Secretary to show that any regulations are “feasible.” 
The third and preferable approach, also rooted in the Avoidance Canon, would be to 
construe the statute so as to require the agency to engage in a form of cost-benefit 
balancing. Such a construction would have the advantage of promoting greater 
transparency and accountability at the agency level.  At the same time, it would raise 
difficult questions about the precise nature of such balancing in the context of 
occupational safety policy and also about legal constraints on agency assessment of both 
costs and benefits. Because of the distinctive nature of workplace safety, the best 
approach would give the agency considerable flexibility on questions of valuation while 
















Is OSHA Unconstitutional?  
Cass R. Sunstein 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Imagine that Congress creates a federal agency to deal with a large problem, one 
that involves a significant part of the national economy. Suppose that Congress instructs 
the agency: Do what you believe is best. Act reasonably and appropriately. Adopt the 
legal standard that you prefer, all things considered.  Suppose, finally, that these 
instructions lack clear contextual referents, such as previous enactments or judicial 
understandings,
1 on which the agency might build. 
  If the nondelegation doctrine exists, as the Supreme Court proclaims,
2 then this 
hypothesized statute would seem to violate it. After all, the Court has not overruled or 
even questioned its decision in the Schechter Poultry case, striking down the National 
Industrial Recovery Act.
3 On the contrary, the Court has continued to insist on the need 
for an “intelligible principle” by which to limit the exercise of agency discretion.
4 
Remarkably, however, the core provision of one of the nation’s most important 
regulatory statutes – the Occupational Safety and Health Act – is not easy to distinguish 
from the hypothesized statute. That provision defines an “occupational safety and health 
standard” as one that is “reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful 
employment or places of employment.”
5  When the Secretary of Labor issues regulations 
governing tractors, ladders, or electrical equipment, the only question to be asked is 
whether one or another standard is “reasonably necessary or appropriate.” 
Notably, this language appears in a mere definitional clause, not in a separate 
substantive provision instructing the Secretary what, exactly, he is supposed to consider 
in deciding what to do. Nor is the agency required to do whatever is “necessary,” strictly 
speaking, in order to provide safe employment; its duty is softened, in the sense that it is 
                                                 
1 Contextual referents are emphasized in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp 737, 748 
(DDC 1971) (“[T]he Court has made clear that the standards of a statute are not to be tested in isolation and 
derive meaningful context from the purpose of the Act, its factual background, and the statutory 
context.”)(internal citations omitted).  
2 See Whitman v. American Trucking Assn., 531 US 457, 487 (2001; Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. 
American Petroleum Institute, 448 US 607, 672 (1980) (Rehnquist concurring). 
3 ALA Schechter Poultry Corp. v. US, 295 US 495, 542 (1935). 
4 Whitman, 531 US at 471; Industrial Union, 448 US at 685–86. 
5 29 USC § 652(8). 
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told to do what is “reasonably necessary.” In fact the agency is not even required to do 
that. Apparently it is permitted to reject what is “reasonably necessary” and instead to 
select what is merely “appropriate.” And how does the agency decide what counts as 
either “reasonably necessary” or “appropriate”? Suppose that the agency chooses to 
proceed in strict accordance with cost-benefit analysis, treating that form of analysis as its 
rule of decision. Is it permitted to do that, on the ground that what is “reasonably 
necessary” or “appropriate” is whatever cost-benefit analysis counsels
6? Or suppose that 
the agency treats cost-benefit analysis as relevant but not conclusive, on the ground that 
(say) $800 million in monetized safety benefits to workers justifies an expenditure of 
$900 million on the part of employers (an expense that could result in increased prices, 
decreased wages, or decreased employment). Would that approach be lawful? Or suppose 
that the agency rejects cost-benefit analysis altogether, and decides to require employers 
to eliminate all “significant” risks (however defined) to the extent that is “feasible” 
(whatever that means). Is there anything in the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” 
language to foreclose that approach? 
 It is tempting to respond that the constitutional problem would be solved if the 
agency adopts subsidiary policy by which to discipline its own discretion.
7 For example, 
the agency might conclude that notwithstanding the vagueness of the statutory language, 
the best way to proceed is through a strict cost-benefit test. But in 2001, the Supreme 
Court squarely rejected the idea that a nondelegation problem can be cured by policy 
judgments at the agency level.
8 In the process – and this is the central difficulty, the 
motivation for posing the central question here – the Court eviscerated the rationale of the 
court of appeals decision that had upheld the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” 
language against constitutional attack.
9 And because of the sheer breath of the agency’s 
                                                 
6 For a theoretical argument to this general effect, see Matthew Adler and Eric Posner, New Foundations 
for Cost-Benefit Analysis (2006). 
7 This strategy is suggested in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp 737, 759 (DDC 1971) 
(“Another feature that blunts the “blank check” rhetoric is the requirement that any action taken by the 
Executive . . . must be in accordance with further standards as developed by the Executive.”). . 
8 See American Trucking, 531 US at 472 (“We have never suggested that an agency can cure an unlawful 
delegation of legislative power by adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of the statute”).  
9 International Union v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665 (DC Cir 1994). 
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power, extending to essentially all of America’s workers, the nondelegation objection is 
especially acute under the Court’s own analysis.
10 
It is true that a narrowing construction from federal courts can rescue a statute 
from a nondelegation challenge,
11 but the question remains: What would be the content of 
any such narrowing construction, if it is to qualify as a construction rather than simple 
policymaking?  The broadest difficulty is that with the “reasonably necessary or 
appropriate” language, Congress appears, at least at first glance, to have made no 
decision at all about the substantive standard under which the Secretary of Labor is 
supposed to proceed. A reader might be tempted to conclude that Congress has said, 
“make things better,” without giving the Secretary guidance about how, exactly, he is to 
go about about accomplishing that task. 
  One of my central aims here is to explore the nondelegation problem in one of the 
few settings in federal law in which that problem is genuinely acute under existing law.
12 
But the discussion is also meant to shed light on some pressing questions for both 
regulatory policy and administrative law. Over 5000 Americans die each year in the 
workplace,
13 and more than four million are injured or sickened by the conditions of their 
employment.
14 Surely steps could be taken to reduce these deaths, injuries, and illnesses. 
Under the statutory language, the Secretary is required to make a wide range of choices 
about what, if anything, to demand of American employers and how, if at all, to protect 
American workers. The agency should do far better than it does.
15 What are the legal 
limits on its authority? Is the agency entitled to do nothing at all? Is it entitled to be 
aggressive, even draconian? Lurking questions involve consistency and transparency. 
Suppose that one OSHA regulation protects a large number of lives at relatively low cost, 
while another regulation protects a small number of lives at a relatively high cost.
16 
                                                 
10 See American Trucking, 531 US at 473 (emphasizing importance of breadth of delegation). 
11 See Industrial Union Dept., supra note, at 646 (“A construction of the statute that avoids this kind of 
open-ended grant should certainly be favored.”).  
12 After American Trucking, supra note, it seems clear that the Court has little interest in reviving the 
nondelegation doctrine. See infra. 
13 See http://www.bls.gov/news.release/cfoi.t01.htm 
14 http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/osh/os/osbl0003.pdf 
15 A dated but still-relevant study is Thomas McGarity and Sidney Shapiro, Workers At Risk: The Failed 
Promise of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (1993). 
16 This does in fact seem to be the pattern. See Stephen Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory 
Policy 26-27 (6
th ed. 2006).  
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Suppose too that the agency’s explanations for its decisions are often opaque, so that it is 
hard to understand why the agency chose one level or regulation rather than another, and 
how the agency sets its own priorities.
17 Can anything be done, before or within the 
agency or in courts, to ensure against crazy-quilt patterns, to clarify why the agency is 
aggressive in some domains and lenient in others, and to ensure a degree of 
accountability, rather than a technocratic smokescreen or fog?  
  As we shall see, there are three possible answers to these questions. The most 
aggressive would be to strike down the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language 
on constitutional grounds. A real attraction of this approach is that it would inevitably 
trigger a democratic debate about the proper content of occupational safety and health 
policy – a debate that would in all likelihood be more sophisticated and constructive than 
the crude discussion, over thirty years ago, that initially produced OSHA.
18 On the other 
hand, courts have been reluctant to invoke the nondelegation doctrine to strike down 
federal legislation, and for exceedingly good reasons.
19 A decision to invalidate OSHA 
would send shock waves through the federal regulatory state, and courts should hesitate 
before doing that. 
The least aggressive approach, rooted in the Avoidance Canon, would be to 
respond to the apparent vagueness of the statutory language by making a serious effort to 
use that language to create floors and ceilings on agency action.  Such an effort might 
plausibly yield three principles. First, the statute requires the agency to regulate serious or 
significant risks; second, it forbids the agency from regulating small or trivial risks; and 
third, it requires the agency to respect the constraints of feasibility. As we shall see, 
judicial insistence on these three requirements would not answer all of the concerns of 
those attracted to the nondelegation objection, but they would go a long way in that 
direction, while significantly helping to improve the operation of the statutory scheme. 
                                                 
17 See infra. 
18 For an outline of the original statute, written near the time of its enactment, see David Currie, OSHA, 
1976 Am Bar Assn Res. J. 1107; for an excellent discussion of the policy dilemmas and of how (poorly) the 
statute handles them, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and Economics – and the New 
Administrative Law, 98 Yale LJ 341 (1998). 
19 The most valuable discussion is Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 69 U Chi L Rev 1721 (2002) (challenging the nondelegation doctrine on originalist and welfarist 
grounds); see also Stewart, supra note (arguing that the nondelegation doctrine is not administrable by 
federal judges). My goal here is not to evaluate the legitimacy or value of the nondelegation doctrine. 
Instead I take the doctrine as a given for purposes of discussion. 
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A third approach, and in some ways the most attractive, would be to construe the 
“reasonably necessary or appropriate” language to mandate some form of cost-benefit 
balancing. On a plausible view, a regulation is not “reasonably necessary” if the benefits 
do not justify the costs, and the word “appropriate” plainly suggests balancing. One 
version of this approach would require the agency to use cost-benefit analysis as the rule 
of decision, so that regulations could go forward only if the monetized benefits exceed 
the monetized costs. But in the context of workplace safety, where distributional concerns 
are obviously relevant, a strict monetary test would run into serious problems. A softened 
and preferable version would require the Secretary to calculate both costs and benefits 
and to find a “reasonable relationship” between the two.
20 An approach of this general 
kind is probably the best response to the nondelegation challenge, and it would also have 
the important virtue of promoting both transparency and coherence in occupational safety 
policy. At the same time, any kind of cost-benefit reading would raise serious questions 
about the application of cost-benefit principles to the distinctive context of occupational 
safety, where those principles might not readily apply, at least not in their standard form. 
I will offer some brief suggestions about how those questions might be answered. 
 
II.  Occupational Safety, Occupational Health, and Delegation 
 
To understand the constitutional issue, it is necessary to explore a complex line of 
cases. Notably, no one has challenged OSHA regulations on constitutional grounds since 
1994.
21 But rulings in that period place the constitutional problem in sharp relief. The 
central problem is hat the Supreme Court’s latest pronouncements, apparently designed to 
restrict the use of the nondelegation doctrine, eliminate the existing line of defense for the 
“reasonably necessary or appropriate” language.
22 
 
A.   Benzene 
 
  The constitutional debate over OSHA began quite unexpectedly in 1980, with the 
Secretary of Labor’s effort to reduce permissible exposure limits to benzene, a known 
carcinogen. In that case, no constitutional objection was raised by the parties. Instead the 
                                                 
20 Industrial Union, 448 US at 667 (Powell concurring). 
21 See International Union v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665 (DC Cir 1994). 
22 American Trucking, supra note, at 472.  
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Court was asked to answer what turned out to be a surprisingly difficult question of 
statutory construction: When the Secretary is regulating carcinogens, what is the legal 
standard
23? To answer that question, the Court had to deal with two independent 
provisions. The first included the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language. The 
second was the provision more specifically governing toxic substances and harmful 
physical agents, which reads, in full, as follows
24: 
  “The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful 
physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately 
assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no 
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such 
employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of 
his working life.” 
  One of the Court’s key tasks was to reconcile the “reasonably necessary or 
appropriate” language, which applies to all occupational safety and health standards, with 
the “no employee will suffer” language, which is limited to standards involving “toxic 
materials or harmful physical agents.” The Court had three principal options. First, it 
could have said that the two provisions, taken together, call for some form of cost-benefit 
analysis. Perhaps a standard is not “reasonably necessary or appropriate” unless the 
benefits exceed the costs; perhaps a standard is not “feasible” if the costs are high and the 
benefits are low. Second, the Court could have said, as the government vigorously 
urged,
25 that the Secretary of Labor is forbidden from regulating on the basis of cost-
benefit analysis, and must instead regulate to the point of (economic and technological) 
feasibility whenever at least one “employee will suffer material impairment” as a result 
of exposure. Third, the Court could have said that a risk could be regulated only if it rose 
to a certain level of significance, in the sense that a statistically small risk (1 in 1 million? 
1 in 100 million? 1 in 50 million?) would not justify regulatory controls. 
  Each of these positions attracted support within the Court. Justice Powell favored 
a form of cost-benefit balancing, in the sense that he would require the agency “to 
determine that the economic effects of its standard” bore “a reasonable relationship to the 
                                                 
23 See Industrial Union Dept., supra note, at 611. 
24 29 USC § 655(b)(5). 
25 448 US at 666. 
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expected benefits.”
26 In his view, a standard is neither “reasonably necessary” nor 
“feasible” if the expenditures are “wholly disproportionate to the expected health and 
safety benefits.”
27 This conclusion makes some intuitive sense, but as a matter of 
interpretation, it runs into evident problems. The toxic materials provision governs 
benzene (a toxic substance), and that provision requires the Secretary to set the standard 
that “most adequately assures . . . that no employee will suffer material impairment of 
health . . . .” Suppose that a regulation would cost $900 million but would save five 
workers from “material impairment of health.” On standard assumptions about the 
monetary valuation of human life, producing a figure of around $6 million,
28 such a 
regulation would impose costs that are disproportionate to benefits. But under the 
statutory language, the agency must nonetheless ensure “that no employee will suffer” -- 
and hence it would be required to proceed even if the monetized costs greatly exceed the 
monetized benefits.  
To be sure, the word “feasible” operates as a firm limit on what the Secretary 
might do. No regulation may be issued if it is not “feasible.” But in light of the structure 
of the sentence, “feasible” means practicable, in the sense of capable of being done, and 
does not entail cost-benefit balancing. If “feasible” referred to cost-benefit balancing, it 
would be inconsistent with the “no employee will suffer” language, because a cost-
benefit test would allow a number of employees to “suffer.” And so the Court ruled in a 
subsequent decision, drawing on ordinary meaning and the structure of the statute to 
suggest that feasible means “practicable.”
29 (I shall turn shortly to some evident puzzles 
here, involving the meaning of feasibility.) 
  In a dissenting opinion commanding four votes, Justice Marshall adopted the 
second position, urged by the government in defense of the benzene regulation.
30 He 
contended that the toxic materials provision, with its “no employee will suffer” language, 
prohibited cost-benefit balancing, and also imposed no requirement that the agency show 
                                                 
26 448 US at 667. 
27 Id.  
28 The value of a statistical life is around $6 million. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear (2006). 
29 American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc v Donovan, 452 US 490, 508 (1981). To be sure, this idea 
raises questions of its own. What, exactly, does it mean for a standard to be “practicable”? Suppose that 
some percentage of affected businesses would fail if the regulation were imposed. What percentage would 
be high enough to make the regulation no longer feasible? 
30 448 US at 688. 
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a risk to be significant, in the sense of exceeding a certain statistical threshold. In his 
view, the specific provision governing toxic substances must prevail over the more 
general “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language. Carefully parsing the text and 
legislative history, Justice Marshall insisted that the agency was not required to quantify 
the risk to establish that it rose to a level of significance.
31 
The Court’s plurality disagreed.
32 Its key argument was that a standard would not 
count as “reasonably necessary or appropriate” unless it would serve to eliminate a 
“significant risk of harm.” The plurality struggled to defend its interpretation by reference 
to the statutory text and history,
33 and it conspicuously failed to come to terms with the 
“no employee will suffer” requirement, which seemed to suggest that a statistically small 
risk (say, one in five million) would trigger regulatory controls if the risk would produce 
death or serious injury in a few employees. Lacking a clear anchor in the standard legal 
materials,
34 the plurality pointed instead to what it saw as the unfortunate implication of 
Justice Marshall’s reading, which would “give OSHA power to impose enormous costs 
that might produce little, if any, discernible benefit.”
35 Here the Court seemed to suggest 
a background principle for use in construing risk-reduction statutes: In the face of doubt, 
such statutes should not be interpreted to authorize the government to impose substantial 
burdens for trivial gains.
36  
To this the plurality added an explicit nondelegation concern: if the statute did not 
require the risk to “be quantified sufficiently to enable the Secretary to characterize it as 
significant in an understandable way,” it might be unconstitutional, and courts should 
favor a “construction . . . that avoids this kind of open-ended grant.”
37 Citing Schechter 
Poultry, the Court thus suggested a nondelegation canon, to the effect that courts should 
favor a construction that grants an agency bounded rather than unbounded authority.
38 
The basic idea is a variation on, or a specification of, the more general Avoidance Canon, 
                                                 
31 Id. at 714 
32 Id at 639–40. 
33 Id. at 639–649. 
34 See, eg, John Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 Sup Ct Rev 223, 
244. 
35 448 US at 645. 
36 See the discussion in Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 Mich L Rev 1651 (2001). 
37 448 US at 646. 
38 See Manning, supra note. 
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asking courts to avoid serious constitutional issues by requiring Congress to speak 
unambiguously if it seeks to raise such issues.
39 If Congress intends to grant an agency 
open-ended authority, to an extent that raises serious nondelegation concerns, it must 
make its will plain.
40 
  For present purposes, the key opinion came from then-Justice Rehnquist.
41 He 
contended that the key provisions amounted to “a legislative mirage, appearing to some 
Members but not to others, and assuming any form desired by the beholder.”
42 In his 
view, the words “to the extent feasible” rendered the toxic substances provision “largely, 
if not entirely, precatory.”
43 Justice Rehnquist did not argue that a nondelegation problem 
would arise if Justice Powell were correct; a requirement of cost-benefit balancing hardly 
offends the Constitution, even though a number of supplemental judgments must be made 
to make such balancing operational.
44 Nor did Justice Rehnquist argue that if Congress 
meant to enact the interpretation favored by the plurality, the statute would create any 
constitutional problem. If Congress instructed an agency to regulate all “significant risks” 
to the point of “feasibility,” the agency would retain considerable discretion, but not to an 
extent that would violate the nondelegation doctrine.
45 And while the plurality suggested 
that the government’s interpretation would be constitutionally troublesome, Justice 
Rehnquist did not make that claim, which is hard to take seriously: Surely Congress holds 
the constitutional power to require aggressive and cost-blind regulation of workplace 
risks, whether or not the underlying risks can be shown to be significant. (For 
nondelegation purposes, there is all the difference in the world between a draconian 
statute, which tells an agency to impose stringent regulation, and an open-ended statute, 
which asks an agency to select its own standard.) Justice Rehnquist essentially urged that 
so long as the nondelegation doctrine exists, Congress must make some choice among the 
three principal interpretive possibilities.  If it has failed to do so – if all courts have is a 
                                                 
39 See Kent v. Dulles, 357 US 116, 130 (1958) . 
40 Id. 
41 448 US at 671. 
42 Id at 681. 
43 Id. at 682. 
44 See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs (1992); for a critique, see Lisa Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman, 
Priceless (2006). 
45 See American Trucking, supra note. 
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“mirage” --  then any intelligible principle must be  supplied by the agency itself, in 
violation of the Constitution. 
  Eight members of the Court disagreed with Justice Rehnquist, not on the ground 
that the italicized claim is wrong, but on the ground that Congress did, in fact make the 
relevant choice. For present purposes, the larger point is that the division within the Court 
raises an obvious question: Suppose the toxic substances provision is not involved and 
that the agency is guided only by the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language. 
How, if at all, would the agency be constrained? The question is far from fanciful, 
because much of the agency’s work does not involve toxic substances, and hence the 
more specific provision, with its “no employee will suffer” and “to the extent feasible” 
language, does not seem to be applicable at all. 
 
B.  Safety standards, health standards, and the new nondelegation doctrine 
 
1.  The challenge. The issue reached the court of appeals in 1991.
46 The case 
involved the agency’s regulation of industrial equipment that might move suddenly and 
hence produce injuries. The regulation required two procedures: “lockout” and “tagout.” 
With “lockout,” certain equipment must be locked, so as to ensure that no movement can 
occur. With “tagout,” a plastic warning must placed on equipment, informing workers 
that the equipment should not be operated unless the tag is removed. In issuing the 
regulation, the agency said that the toxic substances provision was inapplicable and that it 
was governed only by the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language.
47 In the 
agency’s view, the statute drew a sharp distinction between “safety standards” and 
“health standards,” and the more stringent “no employee shall suffer” provision was 
applicable only to the latter. 
Rejecting the agency’s position, the United Auto Workers argued that the toxic 
substances provision did apply and hence that the agency must apply the “significant 
risk/feasibility” framework established in American Petroleum. Noting that the toxic 
substances provision included a reference to “harmful physical agents,” the United Auto 
Workers contended that this provision literally applies to dangerous equipment, which is 
                                                 
46 International Union v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310 (DC Cir 1991). 
47 Id. at 1313. 
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a “physical agent.” The court responded that this argument was a form of sophistry.
48 In 
its view, Congress appeared to have drawn a distinction between health risks and safety 
risks. To support this point, the court noted that the phrase “harmful physical agents” 
appeared in a separate provision that seemed to involve health (“toxic substances and 
other harmful agents”) rather than safety; it concluded that at the very least, the agency 
could reasonably conclude that the toxic releases provision applied only to health 
standards.
49  
The court’s conclusion meant that in issuing safety standards, the Secretary was 
governed only by the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” provision. With the 
background provided by Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in American Petroleum, the 
National Association of Manufacturers challenged that provision as an unconstitutional 
delegation. In responding to that challenge, the agency outlined its understanding of its 
statutory authority.
50 It agreed that it would have to establish a “significant risk.” It added 
that it could not regulate beyond the point that was “both technologically and 
economically feasible.” But it did not treat feasibility as a floor; it could, if it chose, 
regulate far less aggressively. In the court’s words, “the upshot is an asserted power, once 
significant risk is found, to require precautions that take the industry to the verge of 
economic ruin . . . or to do nothing at all.”
51  
The court acknowledged that because agency standards must be applied across 
broad categories, the agency could not punish particular companies that it did not like, 
and hence a central nondelegation concern, involving favoritism, was reduced. 
Nonetheless, some potentially “dangerous favoritism” remained, since stringent standards 
might come down especially hard on small firms and favor large ones.
52 Thus the 
agency’s understanding “would give the executive branch untrammeled power to dictate 
the vitality and even the survival of whatever segments of American business it might 
choose.”
53 The court emphasized that the agency’s discretion covered all of American 
                                                 
48 Id at 1314. 
49 Id. at 1314. 
50 Id at 1318. 
51 Id at 1317. 
52 Id at 1318. 
53 Id  at 1318.  
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enterprise, not a single industry, and that the delegation did not involve a power 
particularly conferred on the president, such as the power over foreign policy.  
  How might the nondelegation problem be cured? Emphasizing the importance of 
predictability and the rule of law, the court’s evident preference was for a narrowing 
construction by the agency, perhaps involving a form of cost-benefit analysis.
54 Evidently 
the court believed that a key purpose of the nondelegation doctrine is to control agency 
discretion, and that if the agency adopted a form of self-binding through a commitment to 
cost-benefit analysis, the constitutional problem would be solved. In other words, the 
agency might supply the requisite “intelligible principle” on its own, and in that way 
overcome the nondelegation challenge. And indeed, the court insisted that cost-benefit 
analysis would be compatible with statutory text and history.
55 The word “reasonably” 
suggests balancing, associated as it is with the “reasonable man” standard in tort law.
56 
Unfortunately, the court did not acknowledge that the word “reasonably” modifies 
“necessary,” and hence the statute failed to impose a freestanding obligation to be 
“reasonable” – perhaps a problem for the cost-benefit interpretation. But the statutory 
phrase is “reasonably necessary or appropriate,” and surely the word “appropriate” could 
(reasonably) be understood to entail cost-benefit balancing. Thus the court refused to 
strike down the statute, emphasizing that it could be interpreted to allow such balancing, 
and could therefore be construed to be constitutional.
57 
 2.  The agency’s response. On remand, the agency declined the court’s invitation 
to construe the statute to require cost-benefit balancing.
58 But it did attempt to a form of 
self-binding through an intelligible principle, or rather through an assortment of such 
principles. Thus the agency listed six principles that would limit its discretion
59: 
 
a.  The risk must be significant. 
b.  Compliance must be economically feasible. 
c.  Compliance must be technologically feasible. 
d.  The standard must use the most cost-effective measures. 
                                                 
54 Id 1319 (“Cost-benefit analysis is certainly consistent with the language of § 3(8).”). 
55 Id 1319.  
56 Id at 1319.  
57 Id. 1321.  
58 International Union v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665 (DC Cir 1994). 
59 Id. at 668.  
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e.  The agency must explain its adoption of a standard departing from any 
national consensus standard. 
f.  The agency must explain its standard by reference to record evidence and also 
explain any inconsistency with prior agency practice. 
 
The court of appeals thought that by themselves, these principles were not 
sufficient to rescue OSHA, because they gave the agency too much room to “roam” 
between different levels of stringency.
60 But the agency added a final criterion. Looking 
at various other sections, the agency said that it has to “provide a high degree of 
employee protection,” moving close to the point of feasibility.
61 Because the agency 
could “deviate only modestly from the stringency of” the health standards, the court said 
that the agency’s approach imposed sufficient discipline to rescue the statute from 
nondelegation attack.
62 The central idea seemed to be that once a significant risk was 
shown, the agency would regulate at least close to the point of feasibility. The agency 
was therefore bound by a set of constraints that amounted, as a whole, to the equivalent 
of the requisite intelligible principle; the nondelegation problem was therefore cured.  
The court’s rationale here raises some immediate questions: What does 
“feasibility” mean? When, exactly, does regulation because so stringent that it is no 
longer “feasible” to comply with it? If a regulation is expensive, it is likely to endanger at 
least one or a few firms. Is such a regulation not “feasible” for that reason? Or are 
massive business failures required? If the agency says the latter, then it faces an evident 
problem: Under that approach, any particular regulation will move industry to the brink 
of massive business failures, and that step will make other regulations impossible to 
absorb even if they are relatively inexpensive. In practice, the agency cannot possibly 
choose regulations that put whole industries on the brink of failure. In this light, a great 
deal of additional work would be helpful to understand actual agency practice in light of 
the feasibility condition – and appropriate legal constraints on that practice. For present 
purposes, the key point is that because of the agency’s emphasis on the need for 
stringency, the court of appeals found that the nondelegation objection was answered. 
 
                                                 
60 Id. at 669.  
61 Id at 669.  
62 Id at 669.  
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C.  The dead nondelegation doctrine 
 
    The court of appeals holdings just discussed suggest a simple principle: If a 
statute is an unconstitutional delegation as written, it can nonetheless be saved as a 
result of subsidiary policymaking by the agency, in the form of a narrowing construction, 
even if that construction is merely optional in light of the standard sources of statutory 
interpretation. This principle amount to a new nondelegation doctrine. But in 2001, the 
Supreme Court unambiguously rejected that doctrine.
63  
The case tested the meaning and validity of a key provision of the Clean Air Act, 
one that appears similar to the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” phrase. That 
provision asks the EPA to issue national ambient air quality standard to the point 
“requisite to protect the public health.”
64 Building on its OSHA decisions, the court of 
appeals held that the statutory phrase was an unconstitutional delegation, because it 
lacked an intelligible principle.
65 What counts as “requisite”? The court thought that 
Congress had not answered that question. “Here it is as though Congress commanded the 
EPA to select ‘big guys,’ and EPA announced that it would evaluate candidates based on 
height and weight, but revealed no cut-off point.”
66 At the same time, the court said that 
the EPA could issue a narrowing construction that would save its constitutionality. In the 
key sentence, the court said that “an agency wielding the power over American life 
possessed by EPA should be capable of developing the rough equivalent of a generic unit 
of harm that takes into account population affected, severity and probability.”
67 Unlike in 
the OSHA cases, the court ruled that the statutory term explicitly banned the agency from 
basing its decisions on cost-benefit analysis.
68 But the agency would be permitted, and 
indeed required, to act in accordance with some kind of quantitative “benefits analysis,” 
requiring regulation when the benefits reached a certain magnitude, and forbidding 
regulation when the benefits did not reach that magnitude.
69 
                                                 
63 Whitman v American Trucking Association, 531 US 457 (2001). 
64 42 USC 7409. 
65 American Trucking Association v. EPA, 175 F3d 1027, 1034 (DC Cir 1999). 
66 175 F.3d at 1034. 
67 Id. at 1039. 
68 Id. at 1038. (“Cost-benefit analysis  . . . is not available . . . .”).  
69 Id. at 1039–40.  
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The Supreme Court rejected this approach.
70 First, it held that a narrowing 
construction by the agency was neither here nor there.
71 The nondelegation doctrine is 
rooted in Article 1, section 1, and in the Court’s view, its purpose is therefore to require 
that laws are made by the national legislature
72; it follows that agency self-binding is 
neither here nor there. Hence the intelligible principle must come from Congress itself. If 
Congress has given an agency a blank check, it does not matter if that agency chooses to 
narrow its discretion, certainly if the narrowing is based on the agency’s own policy 
judgments. Second, the Court held that the statute, as written, was not an unconstitutional 
delegation.
73 National ambient air quality standards must be set at the level that is 
“requisite to protect the public health.” This requirement means that such standards must 
be “sufficient, but not more than necessary.”
74 In the Court’s view, that constraint is 
sufficient to overcome the nondelegation problem.  The Court did emphasize that that 
problem would be analyzed by reference to the scope of the agency’s power, which was 
certainly broad in this case, covering as it did a wide assortment of industries
75; but the 
EPA’s discretion was far from uncabined by the statutory language. 
At first glance, the Court’s analysis on this last point seems hopelessly 
unsatisfying: How is the word “necessary” a useful limitation on agency discretion? The 
objection of the lower court appears unanswered: Doesn’t this provision grant the agency 
the discretion to proceed as stringently as it wishes, without imposing any kind of floor 
and ceiling? But perhaps the Court’s conclusion is not as unhelpful as it seems. A 
national ambient air quality standard could be characterized as more aggressive than 
“necessary,” and therefore as unlawful, if it delivered benefits that are exceedingly small, 
or if it regulated risks that do not concern ordinary people in ordinary life. As Justice 
Breyer wrote, the statute “does not require the EPA to eliminate every health risk, 
however slight, at the expense of any economic risk, however great . . . .”
76 In his view, 
the statute does not authorize the agency “to eliminate all risk – “an impossible and 
                                                 
70 531 US at 472.  
71 Id. at 472. (“Whether the statute delegates legislative power is a question for the courts, and an agency’s 
voluntary self-denial has no bearing upon the answer.”).  
72 On some serious complexities here, see Posner and Vermeule, supra note. 
73 531 US at 476.  
74 Id. at 473 
75 Id. 
76 Id at 494 (Breyer concurring).  
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undesirable objective.”
77 What counts as requisite to protect the public health will “vary 
with background circumstances, such as the public’s tolerance of the particular health 
risk in the particular context at issue.”
78 Thus the agency should consider “the severity of 
a pollutant’s adverse effects, the number of those likely to be affected, the distribution of 
those adverse effects, and the uncertainties surrounding each estimate.”
79 
It follows from these remarks that some imaginable restrictions would violate the 
statute, because they would go beyond the point that is “requisite.” Equally important, it 
also follows that a national standard could be characterized as less aggressive than 
“necessary” if it left a residual risk that was, in fact, significant.
80 Suppose that in light of 
the pollutant’s adverse effects, and the number of people at risk, the EPA’s standard was 
inexplicably lenient. It might well be concluded that such leniency would be unlawful,  
because it would fall short of the level “requisite to protect the public health.”
81  
We might go further. If Justice Breyer’s analysis is put together with the Court’s, 
the EPA’s task may not be radically different from what was sought by the court of 
appeals, that is, to devise “the rough equivalent of a generic unit of harm that takes into 
account population affected, severity and probability.”
82 Without some kind of generic 
unit of harm, it might not be possible for the agency to give an adequate explanation of 
why any particular regulation is more stringent or less stringent than necessary.
83 And to 
this extent, the simple words “requisite to protect the public health” do establish both 
floors and ceilings on agency action.  
To reach this conclusion, courts might rely on the text, simple and brief though it 
is, and need not engage in any especially aggressive form of statutory construction (as the 
Supreme Court did in American Petroleum). The statutory terms in the relevant provision 
                                                 
77 Id. at 494.  
78 Id at 494.  
79 Id at 495.  
80 It is relevant here that in Mass. v. EPA, 549 US --- (2007), the Court held that an agency’s failure to 
respond to a petition to make rules is subject to judicial review. Thus if an agency refuses to make a rule in 
the face of a petition asking for one, courts might review the agency’s refusal as unlawful. The Clean Air 
Act offers particular requirements here. For discussion, see American Lung Association v. EPA, 134 F.3d 
388 (DC Cir 1998). 
81 Id. at 496. See also American Lung Association v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388 (DC Cir 1998) (requiring EPA to 
reconsider failure to issue short-term standard for asthmatics). 
82 175 F3d at 1079. 
83 But see American Trucking Assn. v. EPA, 283 F3d 355 (DC Cir 2001) (applying deferential review to 
ozone and particulates standards). 
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of the Clean Air Act are plausibly taken to invite floors and ceilings – and do so while 
forbidding the agency from engaging in cost-benefit balancing. We shall shortly see how 
this analysis applies to OSHA. 
 
III.   The Constitutional Problem 
 
A.   OSHA’s unnoticed vulnerability 
 
My principal topic is the meaning and validity of the “reasonably necessary or 
appropriate” clause. It will be useful, however, to begin with a brief overview of the 
agency’s practice. 
1. Agency practice: a glance. Since 1994, OSHA safety regulations have not been 
challenged on nondelegation grounds. But the agency has nonetheless issued a number of 
such regulations. In explaining those regulations, the agency has typically offered an 
account of the “pertinent legal authority,”
84 which refers to the “reasonably necessary or 
appropriate” language. In what has become a kind of boilerplate, cutting across 
Republican and Democratic administrations, the agency has explained that a regulation 
satisfies that standard “if it substantially reduces or eliminates significant risk; is 
economically feasible; is technologically feasible; is cost effective; is consistent with 
prior Agency action or is a justified departure; is supported by substantial evidence; and 
is better able to effectuate the Act’s purposes than any national consensus standard it 
supersedes.”
85 A standard counts as economically feasible “if industry can absorb or pass 
on the cost of compliance without threatening its long term profitability or competitive 
structure.”
86 A standard counts as cost-effective “if the protective measures it requires are 
the least costly of the available alternatives that achieve the same level of protection.” In 
addition, safety standards “must be highly protective.”
87 The words “highly protective” 
are not themselves defined, but they are a clear bow in the direction of the holding in the 
International Union case.  
What does all this mean? Some of it means nothing at all, or at least nothing that 
bears on the question at hand. Under existing administrative law doctrine, all agency 
                                                 
84 61 FR 56746, 56790–91 (1996) (Standard for Occupational Exposure to 1,3-Butadiene). 
85 See id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id.  
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decisions must be either consistent with past action or a “justified” departure
88; that 
requirement does not come from OSHA, and it is irrelevant to a nondelegation challenge. 
It is true that under OSHA, any regulation must be supported by substantial evidence,
89 
but the requirement of record evidence is hardly sufficient to respond to a nondelegation 
objection, which points to an absence of statutory standards. Nor is any help provided by 
the idea that any regulation must be “better able to effectuate the Act’s purposes” than the 
standard that it supersedes. This idea merely replicates the idea that a departure must be 
“justified,” and by itself, a reference to “the Act’s purposes” tell us exactly nothing about 
what those purposes are.   
It follows that the agency’s understanding can be reduced to three ideas: (1) the 
risk must be significant; (2) the regulation must be feasible; and (3) within the continuum 
bounded at one end by “very lenient” and at the other by “the constraint of feasibility, the 
agency will choose what is “highly protective.” As I have noted, the word “feasible” is 
misleading. No on-off switch separates the “feasible” from the “infeasible.” Inevitably, 
the agency is exercising some discretion in deciding exactly how aggressive to be.  
  It is true that in assessing significant risk, the regulations often refer to the 
passage in American Petroleum that estimated a significant risk as somewhere between a 
one in a billion risk of death per cancer and a one in a thousand risk.
90  For most of its 
standards, OSHA calculates the significance of a risk in exactly these terms:  it 
determines the rate of death per 1000 workers, assuming a 45-year work life.
91  If the risk 
of death is above 1/1000, it qualifies as significant.
92 As early as 1988, the agency said 
that a risk of over 1.64/1000 counts as significant – and that a risk of 0.6/100,000 “may 
be approaching a level that can be viewed as safe.”
93 But many regulations—and the 
safety standards in particular—express significant risk in terms of the magnitudes of 
annual deaths and injuries, rather than in terms of deaths per 1000 workers.  With a bit of 
math these can be recast in terms of deaths per 1000 workers,
94 and informal calculations 
                                                 
88 See Motor Vehicle Manus. Assn. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile, 463 US 29 (1983). 
89 29 USC 655. 
90 448 US at 655; 61 FR 56746, 56790–91 (1996) (Standard for Occupational Exposure to 1,3-Butadiene). 
91 62 FR 1494, 1562 (1997) (methylene chloride standard) 
92 Id. 
93 Occupational Exposure to Fomaldehude, 52 Fed. Reg. 56,168, 56,234 (1987). 
94 The risk is calculated by divided deaths by workforce size, and multiplying by 45.  See 65 FR 68262-01, 
68556 (ergonomics standard). 
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reveal that whenever we know the magnitude of the annual death and injury rate, the risk 
is greater than one death per 1000 workers (and this does not even count injuries).
95  The 
only exception is the standard for confined spaces, where the risk is indeterminate 
because the size of the workforce is not given.
96 
  As a general practice, the agency’s safety regulations do offer separate statements 
of both costs and benefits, but the agency does not formally compare the monetized 
benefits to the monetized costs to calculate “net” benefits. Costs are stated in dollars and 
benefits are usually expressed in terms of deaths and injuries prevented.  That is, both 
benefits and costs are quantified, but usually only costs are monetized.  Nonetheless, 
assuming $6.8 million as the value of a life (OSHA’s preferred figure during this range), 
every regulation—with one exception
97—that claims to prevent deaths is justified, in 
terms of cost-benefit analysis, on the basis of these prevented deaths alone (not even 
taking injuries into account). 
  It is unclear why the agency only rarely explicitly monetizes prevented deaths or 
injuries, but there is some evidence that the agency does monetize when the ultimate 
question is close.  For example, the agency monetized the 1.3 annual deaths its recent 
electrical installation standard was intended to prevent, and then converted to 2005 
dollars to yield $9.1 million in prevented death benefits.  The regulation cost $9 million.
98  
A recent confined space proposed standard stated monetized benefits of $85 million; the 
regulation cost $77 million.
99 Another case of conspicuous monetization is the 
                                                 
95 For example, in the steel erection safety standard, the significant risk was 35 deaths and 2279 serious 
injuries per year caused by steel erection accidents.  According to the standard, 56,000 workers are exposed 
to the risk.  Using these numbers in the formula above yields a risk of 28 per 1000—clearly significant.  
The closest case appears to be the scaffolding standard, which protects 2.34 million workers from a 
significant risk of 79 deaths and 9750 injuries per year.  61 FR 46026.  This works out to 1.5 deaths per 
1000 worker-lives.  Without the injuries, this would be a close to borderline case.  The ergonomics standard 
did not attempt to quantify risk in terms of deaths, but estimated the risk of musculoskeletal disorders or 
injuries ranging from 33 to 926 cases per 1000 workers, which “are clearly significant by any reasonable 
measure.  65 FR 68262, 68752 (2000). 
96 72 FR 67352 (2007) (with a significant risk of approximately 6 fatalities and 900 injuries per year). 
97 The only exception is the hexavalent chromium standard, 71 FR 10100 (2006).  The cost-benefit analysis 
in this regulation is extensive, perhaps because it is unclear whether the regulation is justified on cost-
benefit grounds.  See id at 10308.  However, since this is a health regulation, OSHA is required to reduce 
the risk to the limits of feasibility. 
98 72 FR 7136 (2007). 
99 72 FR 67352 (2007 proposed regulation).  See also the hexavalent chromium standard, 71 FR 10100, in 
which the monetized benefits were arguably exceeded by the costs. 
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ergonomics standard,
100 overturned by Congress.
101  This standard was unique in that it 
would have prevented only injuries and not deaths.  The agency calculated the value of 
the prevented injuries to be $9.1 billion, with costs of $4.5 billion.
102  According to these 
numbers, the ergonomics standard was not a “close call,”
103 but the controversy 
surrounding the sheer size of the proposed regulation presumably spurred explicit 
monetization. 
2. The surprising effect of American Trucking. The American Trucking decision 
did not exactly invite greater use of the nondelegation doctrine. On the contrary, the 
Court’s insouciant approach to the “requisite to protect the public health” language 
suggested a noticeable absence of enthusiasm for the doctrine. Nonetheless (and there is 
an obvious irony here), the Court’s rejection of the new nondelegation doctrine 
eliminated the route by which the court of appeals had upheld the “reasonably necessary 
or appropriate” language against constitutional attack. After American Trucking, it is 
plain that a narrowing construction by the agency will not save an otherwise unacceptable 
delegation.  If OSHA is to be rescued from constitutional objection, it must be because of 
what the statute says, not because of agency policymaking in the absence of legislative 
guidance. Recall here the emphasis in American Trucking on the scope of the agency’s 
power: Because OSHA covers essentially all American workers, the existence of 
untrammeled discretion would be a serious problem. 
 We are now in a position to see the central difficulty. After American Trucking, 
everything turns on whether the phrase “reasonably necessary or appropriate” sets out an 
intelligible principle. To be sure, the statutory provision would be valid if it could be 
treated as analogous to the national ambient air quality provisions of the Clean Air Act. 
As we have seen, the Court upheld the phrase “requisite to protect the public health” on 
the ground that it forbids cost-benefit balancing and calls for a cost-blind inquiry into 
how much regulation is “necessary.” In the Court’s view, that inquiry is not unguided. 
But there are real difficulties in understanding OSHA to mean the same thing as the 
Clean Air Act. As construed by the court of appeals, the words “reasonably necessary or 
                                                 
100 65 FR 68262 (2000). 
101 See Cong. Rec. H684, Mar. 7,2001, roll call no. 33. 
102 65 FR 68262 (2000). 
103 Id. 
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appropriate” are plausibly but not necessarily taken to authorize cost-benefit balancing – 
and thus seem to leave it to the Secretary to decide whether the statute requires cost-
benefit analysis or not. In other words, Congress has not set out an intelligible principle 
supporting or rejecting cost-benefit analysis. Whether standards must be based on that 
form of analysis is for the agency to decide. Perhaps this is a fatal defect. Insofar as the 
words “reasonably necessary or appropriate” are involved, Justice Rehnquist’s original 
objection seems at least plausible: The agency has been authorized to chose whatever 
principle it likes.  
To be sure, the very idea of an “intelligible principle” poses its own difficulties. 
What, exactly, does that idea mean? The best answer points to the purpose of the 
nondelegation doctrine, which is to ensure that Congress, as the national lawmaker, does  
not grant blank checks to the executive branch (or anyone else).
104 If Congress has set out 
an intelligible principle, agency discretion is sufficiently bounded. On this view, it might 
well be unacceptable for Congress to tell an agency to do as it chooses or whatever “the 
public interest requires” – unless the notion of the public interest, in context, offers 
sufficient discipline.
105 In this light, it should be clear that the difference between a 
principle that is “intelligible” and one that is not is inevitably one of degree. The question 
becomes how much discretion is too much discretion – a question that is not easily 
administered by federal courts. The difficulty of judicial administration is a standard 
objection to aggressive judicial enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine, even 
assuming that it has firm constitutional roots.
106 But as the doctrine now stands, it is 
necessary to ask how, if at all, OSHA limits the agency’s room to “roam.” 
How might courts respond to this problem? There are three possibilities. 
 
B.   Solutions and proposals 
 
1.  Invalidation. The most aggressive approach would be to invalidate the 
provision on constitutional grounds. To be sure, invalidation would represent the first 
                                                 
104 On the complexities here, see Posner and Vermeule, supra note. 
105 The  Federal Communications Commission is generally controlled only by a test that  refers to the 
“public interest, convenience, and necessity.” 47 USC 303. For discussion, see Randolph May, The Public 
Interest Standard: Is it Too Indeterminate to be Constitutional? (2001), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=294712 
106 See Mistretta v US, 488 US 361, 382 (Scalia, J, dissenting) (emphasizing difficulties in judicial 
implementation of nondelegation doctrine). 
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invocation of the nondelegation doctrine to strike down a federal statute in over seventy 
years (and only the third in the nation’s history
107). In addition, it would send shock 
waves through the administrative state. But unlikely as it seems, disruptive though it 
would be, and radical as it would appear, that step is not entirely without appeal. 
In American Trucking, the Court emphasized that the statutory phrase “requisite 
to protect the public health” does not seem more open-ended that several other statutory 
phrases that the Court has upheld against nondelegation attack. As we have seen, the 
“reasonably necessary or appropriate” clause is plausibly different, because that phrase 
seems to allow (but not to require) the agency to use some form of cost-benefit analysis 
as a rule of decision. It would therefore be easy to distinguish American Trucking on the 
ground that while Congress set out an intelligible principle to govern national ambient air 
quality standards, it failed to do so in the context of occupational safety standards. The 
basic idea would be that in the relevant provision of the Clean Air Act, Congress 
instructed the agency to engage in a cost-blind analysis inquiry into how much protection 
is “requisite,” whereas in OSHA, Congress left the agency at sea. 
At the same time, invalidation would force, for the first time, a sustained 
legislation encounter with the exceedingly difficult questions of policy raised by 
occupational safety and health regulation. When the statute was originally enacted in 
1970, Congress did not seriously grapple with those problems.
108 Instead it rested content 
with recognizing the existence of a problem and the need for a regulatory solution.
109 In 
the last decades, public officials have learned an immense amount about how to think 
about regulation. Much of this learning might be brought to bear on a new enactment.
110 
Of course there is disagreement about how best to incorporate what has been learned,
111 
but that is precisely the question for democratic engagement. This is not the place for a 
sustained discussion of regulatory reform in the domain of occupational safety, but a few 
notations might be helpful. 
                                                 
107 The other two are ALA Schechter Poultry Corp. v. US, 295 US 495 (1935); Panama Refining, 293 US 
539 (1935). In this respect, the nondelegation doctrine has had only one good year. 
108 See Currie, supra note; Rose-Ackerman, supra note. 
109 See id. 
110 For various perspectives, see id.; W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs (1992); W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Risk 
Regulation (2000); Sidney Shapiro and Thomas McGarity, Rethinking OSHA, 6 Yale J Reg 1 (1989). 
111 Thus Viscusi, supra note, emphasizes the value of balancing via cost-benefit analysis, while Thomas 
McGarity and Sidney Shapiro, Workers At Risk 292-304 (1993), argue for more aggressive regulation. 
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It is now clear, for example, that information disclosure is sometimes the best 
response to serious risks.
112 It is plausible to think that the first line of defense, in the 
domain of worker safety, should be a requirement that employers inform employees 
about the hazards that they face.
113 In principle, disclosure should create an incentive to 
increase safety at the same time that it should ensure that workers receive a wage 
premium for the relevant risks.
114 Congress might well instruct OSHA to ensure that 
when the workplace exposes workers to risks above a certain threshold, they must be 
warned.
115 
At the same time, we know a great deal about the limits of disclosure strategies, 
stemming in part from bounded rationality on the part of those who must assess risks.
116 
There is reason to believe that many workers are “risk optimists,” reducing cognitive 
dissonance by concluding that the workplace is safer than it actually is.
117 To the extent 
that this is so, information disclosure may not work. At the very least, it is necessary to 
ensure that workers adequately process the information that they receive, in part so that 
they do not conclude, falsely, that they are relatively immune from statistical risks.
118 In 
Congress might require the agency to supplement disclosure requirements in two 
different ways. First, it might impose clear bans on risks that reasonable employees 
would not be willing to run.
119 Second, it might ban employers from exposing employees 
to certain risks when the monetized benefits of the ban outweigh the monetized costs, in a 
variation on the Safe Drinking Water Act.
120   
Very plausibly, however, a strict cost-benefit test is not appropriate in this 
context. Distributional considerations matter. It is imaginable, for example, that a $800 
million cost would be justified for a benefit of $700 million in increased safety – if, for 
example, the cost was borne mostly by consumers, and if the benefit took the form of 100 
                                                 
112 See Archon  Fung et al., Full Disclosure (2006). 
113 Rose-Ackerman, supra note. 
114 On wage premiums, see W. Kip Viscusi, Risk by Choice (1983). 
115 Note that the agency does have a  “hazard communication policy,” which requires disclosure in certain 
circumstances. 29 CFR 1910.1210. For discussion, see 
http://www.ehrs.columbia.edu/HazardCommunicationPolicy.html 
116 See Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason (2002). 
117 See George Akerlof, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, in An Economic Theorist’s 
Book of Tales (1989). 
118 For relevant discussion, see Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge (2008). 
119 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note. 
120 42 USC 42300g et seq. 
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lives saved each year. Even if the monetized costs exceed the monetized cost under 
standard assumptions about valuation,
121 it is reasonable to think that the agency should 
proceed in these circumstances. Perhaps the welfare effects of the regulation are 
desirable, on net, whatever the monetized analysis suggests. Perhaps the welfare gains to 
workers, in terms of safety, exceed the overall welfare losses (to employers, customers, 
and workers themselves, who might find themselves with reduced wages or without 
jobs). Monetary measures are based on willingness to pay, and it is possible that the 
welfare gain is greater than the welfare loss even if the monetized costs are greater than 
the monetized benefits. Even if this point does not hold, perhaps the regulation would be 
justified on redistributive grounds. If workers gain a great deal in terms of safety, perhaps 
the agency should proceed even if others (employers, consumers) lose more than workers 
gain.  
Of course it is conventional to think that the best way to handle distributive 
considerations is through the tax system, with the suggestion that the intended 
beneficiaries would be better off with a cash payment than with a regulatory requirement, 
which may not help them much or even at all.
122 It is possible that mandatory safety 
regulations will result in reduced wages and decreased employment, and if so, it is not 
clear that workers, as a whole, will benefit from such regulations. Perhaps the losses in 
terms of wages and employment opportunities exceed the gains in terms of safety. We 
need to know something about the incidence of the various costs. If redistribution is the 
goal, the tax system is the preferred means. But at least it can be said that an occupational 
safety regulation might have desirable redistributive consequences, especially but not 
only if workers lack information – and if it does, the agency might legitimately take those 
consequences into account. 
On an attractive view, with roots in Justice Powell’s opinion in American 
Petroleum, the agency should be required to show a “reasonable relationship” between 
benefits and costs, and distributional considerations, and concerns about equity, might 
overcome what would follow from a strictly monetary test.
123 It is important to know who 
                                                 
121 For discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life, 54 Duke LJ 385 (2004). 
122 On some of the complexities here, see id. 
123 See Executive Order 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (1990) (referring to distributive impacts and also to 
equity). 
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bears the costs and who enjoys the benefits, not merely the magnitude of both of these. 
But my primary goal here is not to specify what Congress should require the agency to 
consider. It is instead to suggest that there could be real value in democratic engagement 
with that question, especially in light of the relevant learning in the last decades.
124 One 
argument for use of the nondelegation  doctrine – or perhaps it is a mere hope
125 -- is that 
invalidation of the statute might produce a better, because more informed, occupational 
safety law. 
2. Of significant and insignificant risks. If possible, courts should avoid the heavy 
constitutional artillery, simply because of the disruption that invalidation would cause, 
and because of the many problems with judicial use of the nondelegation doctrine.
126 The 
least aggressive approach would build on both the agency’s current practices and Justice 
Breyer’s opinion in American Trucking so as to create floors and ceilings on agency 
action. A central claim here would be that courts should construe the disputed provision 
so as to avoid constitutional doubts – a principle that would, in this context, call for an 
interpretation that would limit agency discretion. The result of a reasonable interpretation 
would be to produce a band of judgments within which agency outcomes must fall. There 
are three major points here. 
The first is that after American Petroleum, we know that the agency must 
establish that it is seeking to regulate a “significant” risk. It is not permitted to conclude 
that a standard is “reasonably necessary or appropriate” if the risk is trivial. A judgment 
about the significance of a risk would call for an assessment of both the magnitude and 
the probability of harm. If, for  example, an industry practice exposes hundreds of 
thousands of workers to a 1/1000 risk of mortality or serious injury, the risk 
unquestionably qualifies as significant. As the exposed population becomes smaller, the 
probability decreases, and the magnitude of the harm drops, it is harder to categorize the 
risk as “significant.”  As several decisions have held, some risks have not been shown to 
be above the relevant floor.
127 In this respect, OSHA does overlap with the Clean Air Act 
at issue in American Trucking. While the latter statute forbids regulations that are not 
                                                 
124 See Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 USC 42300g et seq. 
125 See Posner and Vermeule, supra note. 
126 See note supra. 
127 See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11
th Cir 1992). 
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“requisite to protect the public health,” and thus bans the agency from imposing 
restrictions on trivial risks, the Court has made clear that OSHA has a similar 
requirement,
128 in the sense that the Secretary of Labor is not authorized to proceed 
unless the risk reaches a certain threshold. 
The second point is that if a risk is significant, the agency is not permitted to 
ignore it.
129 If the agency regulates weakly, and another regulation would be far more 
protection, it has failed to do what is “reasonably necessary or appropriate.” Indeed, the 
agency might well be subject to judicial review if it fails to respond to a petition to 
produce a rule dealing with a substantial safety problem.
130 If the agency refuses to 
address a significant risk, it had better explain itself. To this extent, OSHA is analogous 
to the Clean Air Act; just as the agency cannot be too draconian, so too it cannot be too 
lenient.
131 In both contexts, there are both floors and ceilings on agency action. It is true 
the words “reasonably” and “or appropriate” soften OSHA in ways that the word 
“requisite” does not. But if the agency ignores a significant risk, or fails to eliminate such 
a risk, it is required to offer a good explanation, made out in terms of statutorily relevant 
factors.  
The third point is that “feasibility” operates as a constraint on what the agency 
might do or require.
132  This conclusion is less than obvious, because the “reasonably 
necessary or appropriate” language does not, by itself, constrain the agency in this way; 
that language lacks a feasibility limitation.  Perhaps the agency could deem a restriction 
“reasonably necessary” even if it would create serious economic dislocations – at least if 
the underlying risk is sufficiently large. But there are two problems with this conclusion. 
The first is that a regulation might well be considered neither “reasonably necessary” nor 
“appropriate” if it would not be feasible as a matter of either economics or technology. A 
restriction that would cause massive business failures would not seem to be 
                                                 
128 See 448 US at 491. 
129 Cf. American Lung Association v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388 (DC Cir 1998) (requiring EPA to reconsider 
failure to issue short-term standard for asthmatics). 
130 See Mass. v. EPA, 549 US --- (2007) (holding that failure to respond to petition to make rule is subject 
to judicial review). 
131 Id.  
132 See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962  (11
th Cir. 1992). 
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“appropriate.” By itself, this argument may not be decisive,
133 but an argument from 
statutory structure strongly supports this conclusion. Note that the more aggressive toxic 
substances provision, governing health standards, contains an explicit feasibility 
limitation,
134 and it would be odd indeed to construe the less stringent and more general 
definitional clause not to include the same limitation. In view of the statutory structure, 
limiting health standards to the “feasible,” it makes sense to say that safety standards 
must be feasible as well. As I have emphasized, the idea of feasibility is far from self-
defining, and inevitably it leaves a great deal of discretion to the agency. But that degree 
of discretion does not create a serious constitutional issue. 
Are these three limitations, taken as a whole, sufficient to save the statute against 
a nondelegation challenge? Probably, but the answer is not obvious. If an intelligible 
principle is required, floors and ceilings may not be enough; we might also need some 
principle to tell us how to choose between the floor and the ceiling. As the court of 
appeals observed in International Union,
135 the three principles leave the agency with 
considerable discretion on a crucial issue, which is stringency. Suppose that the agency 
decided to regulate a significant risk to the maximum point, that is, the point of 
feasibility. Apparently that decision would satisfy the statutory requirements. By contrast, 
suppose that the agency decided to regulate a significant risk only slightly, to the point 
where it would be cut in half. Perhaps that decision would be unlawful if it allowed a 
significant risk to remain. But suppose that the agency decided to regulate a significant 
risk, not to the point of feasibility, but to the extent justified by a strict cost-benefit test. 
Suppose, in other words, that the agency concluded that a regulation of a significant risk 
was “reasonably necessary or appropriate” only if the benefits exceeded the costs. At first 
glance, that approach would be consistent with the statute as well. It would be consistent, 
but not mandatory – and the fact that the agency would have discretion to choose, on its 
own, between “significant risk-feasibility,” or instead “significant risk-cost/benefit 
balancing,” might seem to doom the statute on constitutional grounds. 
                                                 
133 Cf. Lead Industries v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (DC Cir 1980) (holding that feasibility does not constrain 
EPA authority to issue national ambient air quality standards). 
134 29 USC § 655(b)(5). 
135 34 F.3d at 145. 
 28 
The best response is that this degree of discretion, while substantial, does not 
amount to a blank check. The three principles are sufficiently intelligible, and sufficiently 
constraining, to respond to the constitutional objection. To those who reject this response 
but want to avoid invalidation, there is a remaining option. 
3.  Cost-benefit analysis. That option would require some form of cost-benefit 
analysis. The basic idea would be that the statutory text mandates that kind of analysis – 
and that the agency is forbidden from refusing to base its decisions on some form of 
balancing. Under the statutory phrase, the agency cannot proceed unless it has assessed 
both costs and benefits, and shown that the latter justify the former. 
It is easy to see the form that such a ruling might take. As the court of appeals 
suggested in Industrial Union, the statute uses the term “reasonably necessary,” and the 
adverb might well be taken to call for a form of balancing.
136 We have seen that the word 
“reasonably” distinguishes OSHA from the Clean Air Act provisions governing national 
ambient air quality standards, which use the unmodified term “requisite.” The words “or 
appropriate” strengthen the argument. Taken as a whole, the statutory phrase “reasonably 
necessary or appropriate” might well be taken to suggest a general reasonableness 
standard, one that requires benefits to justify costs. Courts of appeals have taken a similar 
approach in the context of disability discrimination, in which the phrase “reasonable 
accommodation” has been understood to require a plaintiff to show, not that an 
accommodation passes a strict cost-benefit test, but that the costs would not be 
disproportionate to the benefits.
137 In the context of OSHA, such a construction would 
have the additional benefit of eliminating the nondelegation problem. If courts can 
construe the statutory language in such a way as to avoid that problem, they should do 
exactly that.  
The strongest objection to this construction is that the statute does not 
unambiguously require it, and under established doctrine, an agency is permitted to 
interpret statutory ambiguities as it reasonably sees fit.
138 The best response is that this 
principle is trumped by the Avoidance Canon: Agencies are not permitted to construe 
                                                 
136 See 998 F.2d at 1319.  
137 See, e.g., Vande Zande v. Wisconsin,  44 F3d 538 (7
th Cir 1995). 
138 Chevron v. NRDC, 467 US 837 (1984). 
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statutes in such a way as to raise serious constitutional objections.
139 Suppose that we are 
tempted to agree with the court of appeals that unless the Avoidance Canon is invoked, 
the statute is properly construed to allow the agency to choose between an approach that 
requires cost-benefit balancing and an approach that does not. The problem is that under 
this approach, the nondelegation problem would reemerge. The solution to that problem 
is to hold that “reasonably necessary or appropriate” requires, and does not merely 
permit, cost-benefit balancing. It is true, of course, that the Avoidance Canon requires 
some intelligible principle, and that cost-benefit balancing is only one candidate; floors 
and ceilings, of the kind described above, are the primary alternative.  
We shall shortly see that such balancing has significant advantages. For the 
moment, it will be useful to see how the agency’s safety regulations fit within the 




Data on Cost per Statistical Life Saved  
 
Regulation Agency  Year  Category 
Cost per 
statistical 
life  saved 
(millions 
of 2002 $) 
Electrical Safety   OSHA-S  1990  Safety  0.1 
Childproof Lighters  CPSC  1993  Safety  0.1 
Logging Operations  OSHA-S  1994  Safety  0.1 
Respiratory Protection  OSHA-H  1998  Other  0.1 
Steering Column Protection  NHTSA  1967  Safety  0.2 
Unvented Space Heaters  CPSC  1980  Safety  0.2 
Safety Standards for 
Scaffolds OSHA-S  1996  Safety  0.2 
Trihalomethanes EPA  1979  Toxin  control  0.3 
Cabin Fire Protections  FAA  1985  Safety  0.3 
Organ Procurement  HHS  1998  Other  0.3 
AED on Large Planes  FAA  2001  Other  0.3 
Food Labeling  FDA  1993  Other  0.4 
Electrical Power Generation  OSHA-S  1994  Safety  0.4 
Stability and Control During  NHTSA  1995  Safety  0.4 
                                                 
139 See, eg., Rapanos v. US, 547 US 715 (2006); Edward DeBartolo v. Florida Gulf Coast, 485 US 568  
(1988);  Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F3d 484 (9
th Cir 2006); Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F3d 947 
(DC Cir 2004); AFL-CIO v. FEC, 333 F3d 168 (DC Cir 2003). 
140 This table is taken from Robert H. Hahn and Paul C. Tetlock, The Evolving Role of Economic Analysis 
in Regulatory Decision Making (2007), available at http://www.reg-markets.org/ 
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Regulation Agency  Year  Category 
Cost per 
statistical 
life  saved 
(millions 
of 2002 $) 
Breaking/Trucks 
Mammography Standards  HHS  1997  Other  0.4 
Fuel System integrity  NHTSA  1975  Safety  0.5 
Underground Construction  OSHA-S  1983  Safety  0.5 
Passive Restraints  NHTSA  1984  Safety  0.5 
Head Impact Protection  NHTSA  1995  Safety  0.7 
Servicing Wheel Rims  OSHA-S  1984  Safety  0.9 
Alcohol and Drug Control  FRA  1985  Safety  0.9 
Reflective Devices for Heavy 
Trucks NHTSA  1999  Safety  0.9 
Seat Cushion Flammability  FAA  1984  Safety  1 
Side Impact and Autos  NHTSA  1990  Safety  1.1 
Medical Devices  FDA  1996  Other  1.1 
Floor Emergency Lighting  FAA  1984  Safety  1.2 
Crane Suspended Personnel 
Platform OSHA-S  1984  Safety  1.5 
Low-Altitude Windshear   FAA  1988  Safety  1.8 
Electrical Equipment 
sts/Metal Mines  MSHA  1970  Safety  1.9 
Traffic Alert and Collision 
Avoidance FAA  1988  Safety  2.1 
Trenching and Excavation  OSHA-S  1989  Safety  2.1 
Side Doors  NHTSA  1970  Safety  2.2 
Children's Sleepwear 
Flammability  CPSC 1973  Safety  2.2 
Concrete and Masonry 
Construction  OSHA-S 1985 Safety  2.4 
Confined Spaces  OSHA-S  1993  Safety  2.5 
Hazard Communication  OSHA-S  1983  Safety  3.1 
Child Restraints  NHTSA  1999  Safety  3.3 
Benzene/Fugitive Emissions  EPA  1984  Toxin control  3.7 
Rear/Up/Shoulder 
Belts/Autos NHTSA  1989  Safety  4.4 
Tire Pressure Monitoring 
Systems* DOT  2005  Safety    4.8 
Asbestos OSHA-H  1972  Toxin  control  5.5 
EDB Drinking Water  EPA  1991  Toxin control  6 
NOX SIP Call  EPA  1998  Other  6 
Occupant Crash Protection* 
DOT-
NHTSA  2004 Safety  6.3 
Benzene/Revised Coke by 
Products  EPA 1988  Toxin  control  6.4 
Radionuclides/Uranium 
mines EPA  1984  Toxin  control  6.9 
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Regulation Agency  Year  Category 
Cost per 
statistical 
life  saved 
(millions 
of 2002 $) 
Roadway Worker Protection  FRA  1997  Safety  7.1 
Arsenic and Clarifications to 
Compliance and New Source 
Contaminants Monitoring*  EPA 2001  Toxin  control  8.2 
Grain Dust  OSHA-S  1988  Safety  11 
Electrical Equipment 
Standards/Metal Mines   MSHA 1970  Safety  13 
Methylene Chloride  OSHA-H  1997  Toxin control  13 
Arsenic/Glass paint  EPA  1986  Toxin control  19 
Benzene OSHA-H  1987  Toxin  control  22 
Arsenic/Copper smelter  EPA  1986  Toxin control  27 
Uranium Mill 
Tailings/Inactive EPA  1983  Toxin  control  28 
Hazardous Wastes Listing 
for Petroleum Sludge  EPA  1990  Toxin control  29 
Acrylonitrile OSHA-H  1978  Toxin  control  31 
Benzene/Revised: Transfer 
Operations EPA  1990  Toxin  control  35 
4.4 methlyenedianiline  OSHA-H  1992  Toxin control  36 
Nat. Primary & Secondary 
Drinking Water Regulations 
Phase II  EPA  1991  Toxin control  50 
Coke Ovens  OSHA-H  1976  Toxin control  51 
Uranium mill 
Tailings/Active EPA  1983  Toxin  control  53 
Asbestos OSHA-H  1986  Toxin  control  66 
Asbestos/Construction OSHA  1994  Toxin  control  71 
Arsenic OSHA-H  1978  Toxin  control  77 
Asbestos Ban  EPA  1989  Toxin control  78 
Ethylene Oxide  OSHA-H  1984  Toxin control  80 
Lockout/ Tagout  OSHA-S  1989  Safety  98 
Hazardous Waste 
Management/Wood Products  EPA  1990  Toxin control  140 
DES (Cattlefeed)  FDA  1979  Toxin control  170 
Benzene/Revised: Waste ops  EPA  1990  Toxin control  180 
Land Disposal Restrictions  EPA  1990  Toxin control  530 
Sewage Sludge Disposal  EPA  1993  Toxin control  530 
Hazardous Waste: Solids 
Dioxin EPA  1986  Toxin  control  560 
Prohibit Land Disposal  EPA  1988  Toxin control  1100 
Land Disposal 
Restrictions/Phase II  EPA  1994  Toxin control  2600 
Drinking Water: Phase II  EPA  1992  Toxin control  19000 
Formaldehyde OSHA-H  1987  Toxin  control  78000 
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Regulation Agency  Year  Category 
Cost per 
statistical 
life  saved 
(millions 
of 2002 $) 
Solid Waste Disposal 
Facility Criteria  EPA 1991  Toxin  control  100000 
 
 
What is striking about the OSHA’s safety rules is the variability in cost per life 
saved – from a low of $100,000 (a real bargain) to a high of $11 million (above the 
standard figure, within the federal government, of around $6 million
141). The fact that 
OSHA safety regulations are concentrated toward the lower end of the range suggests the 
possibility of further opportunities for life-saving regulations. To be sure, these particular 
figures should be taken with many grains of salt, among other things because they do not 
include savings short of mortalities averted. The only point is that a glimpse at the figures 
shows significant and apparently inexplicable variability across safety regulations. Cost-
benefit analysis might well help to increase sense and coherence. 
Of course any cost-benefit approach leaves some crucial questions unanswered. 
Hard-line enthusiasts for the nondelegation doctrine might object that those questions are 
so large that cost-benefit analysis, in the abstract, itself raises nondelegation concerns. 
What is the appropriate valuation of a statistical risk of mortality
142? Should a statistical 
life be valued at $1 million, $6 million, $10 million, or $30 million? How should the 
agency value the thousands of injuries, falling short of mortality, that come from 
workplace accidents? Independent of the question of valuation, must the agency follow a 
strict cost-benefit test, in accordance with which regulations are banned if the monetary 
costs outweigh the monetary benefits? Or should the agency be permitted to give weight 
as well to distributional factors – as, for example, through a decision that a monetized 
cost of $900 million justifies a monetized benefit of $700 million, after a finding the 
latter would be felt by employers and their customers, whereas the latter would be felt 
largely by workers, given a chance to live longer and healthier lives?  
To require a reasonable relationship between costs and benefits, it is not necessary 
for courts to answer such questions. In light of the worker-protective goals of OSHA, 
                                                 
141 See Sunstein, supra note. 
142 For relevant discussion, see Viscusi, supra note; Sunstein, Valuing Life, supra note. 
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surely it would be legitimate and perhaps mandatory to take account of redistributive 
goals,
143 and to proceed if workers would be significantly benefited and if the costs are at 
least proportionate to that benefit. The agency should therefore be required to show, not 
that a regulation satisfies a strict cost-benefit test, but that the costs have a reasonable 
relationship to the benefits. If the monetized costs exceed the monetized benefits, the 
agency should be permitted to proceed so long as there is such a relationship between the 
two. Recall that even if a safety regulation fails a cost-benefit test by standard measures, 
it might produce welfare benefits on net. We have seen that those standard measures 
involve “willingness to pay,”
144 and they are only a crude measure of welfare effects.
145 
The agency could well decide that a rule would have desirable welfare effects even if the 
monetized benefits were lower than the monetized costs. 
To be sure, authority to consider distributive goals increases the discretion given 
to the agency; but so long as the benefits and costs must be shown to be proportional, the 
constitutional problem is not serious. I have emphasized that a cost-benefit approach to 
workplace safety regulations would raise many questions, but one of the advantages of 
that approach is that it would force the agency to ask and answer those questions in 
public. In addition, a proportionality test would have the advantage of fitting plausibly 
well with the agency’s own practice, both in terms of its conclusions and its standard 
rationale.
146 We have seen that the agency typically strives to give some accounting of 
both costs and benefits – and that in general, a reasonable relationship seems to exist 
between the two. The problem is that without the pressure of legal constraint, the 
agency’s inquiry into costs and benefits is ad hoc and undisciplined, and produces some 
of the variability captured in Table 1. A cost-benefit construction, of the sort suggested 
here, would ensure greater transparency and regularity. It would also have the advantage 
of promoting greater clarity and monitoring of agency discretion – of increasing the 
                                                 
143 On some of the complexities here, see Rose-Ackerman, supra note. As I have noted, it is incorrect to 
proceed as if an occupational safety standard automatically transfers resources from employers to 
employees. In all probability, employees will themselves bear some of the relevant costs, as for example 
through decreased wages and fewer employment opportunities. For illuminating discussion, see Christine 
Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 Stan. L Rev. 223 (2000). 
144 See Viscusi, supra note; Adler and Posner, supra note. 
145 See Adler and Posner, supra note. 
146 See supra. 
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likelihood that when the agency chooses one degree of stringency rather than another, its 
judgment can be scrutinized in public. 
  
C.    Of narrowing constructions and subsidiary policymaking: a puzzle and a 
 clarification 
 
There is a final puzzle, and it raises a large issue with respect to the relationship 
between courts and the administrative state. That issue involves the status of narrowing 
constructions, designed to avoid nondelegation challenges by construing agency 
discretion to be narrow rather than broad.
147 Such narrowing constructions are not 
uncommon,
148 and I have suggested that the cost-benefit approach is best justified as an 
example. But the whole approach raises a serious question. The problem, in sum, is that 
if, as American Trucking teaches, agencies are not permitted to rescue open-ended 
delegations through subsidiary policymaking in the guise of interpretation, courts should 
not be permitted to do so either.
149  The question therefore arises: What is the status of the 
Avoidance Canon, in the specific context of a nondelegation challenge, in the aftermath 
of American Trucking? 
At first glance, nothing in American Trucking should endanger the use of the 
Avoidance Canon. The Court’s suggestion was merely that if a statute does confer open-
ended authority on an agency, the agency cannot eliminate that problem by deciding how 
much discretion to exercise. “The idea that an agency can cure an unconstitutionally 
standardless delegation of power by declining to exercise some of that power seems to us 
internally contradictory. The very choice of which portion of the power to exercise–that 
is to say, the prescription of the standard that Congress had omitted–would itself be an 
exercise of the forbidden legislative authority.”
150 The new nondelegation doctrine, 
repudiated by American Trucking, asked agencies to develop “subsidiary policy” by 
which to discipline their discretion under open-ended statutes. The reason is that the 
                                                 
147 For an illuminating and detailed treatment, see John Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine As A Canon 
of Avoidance, 2000 Supreme Court Review 223 (2000). 
148 This approach has been followed in many cases. See, e.g, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 
F. Supp 737, 748 (DDC 1971). 
149 See Manning, supra note. 
150 American Trucking, 531 US at 472. 
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development of subsidiary policy counts as an exercise of discretion. It is not 
“interpretation.” 
If American Trucking is understood in this way, it certainly suggests that courts 
cannot rescue a statute from a nondelegation challenge if they are themselves making 
subsidiary policy. But when a court is legitimately selecting an interpretation that 
narrows agency discretion, it is not really making subsidiary policy, certainly not in the 
sense that the court of appeals deemed sufficient, and the Supreme Court irrelevant, in 
American Trucking. Instead a court that properly uses the Avoidance Canon is relying on 
standard legal materials to hold that of two or more plausible interpretations of a text, the 
agency is bound by the one that gives it limited rather than open-ended authority. An 
approach of this kind would not be legitimate if the standard legal materials left both 
court and agency at sea – if the narrower interpretation does not qualify as an 
interpretation at all. But if courts can fairly insist on that interpretation, as a reasonable 
way of coming to terms with what Congress has actually said, American Trucking creates 
no obstacle.  
Here, then, is a possible problem with the approaches I have outlined. Suppose 
that the relevant interpretation is really an exercise in policymaking – that courts are 
choosing an intelligible principle not on the basis of anything that Congress has done, but 
as a means of implementing what judges see as the best way to come to terms with a 
difficult problem. Under American Trucking, the “floors and ceilings” approach, and the 
cost-benefit approach, would not cure the nondelegation problem if they amounted to 
judicial policymaking. But I have argued that on the basis of the standard legal materials, 
both approaches are legitimate readings of the legal materials in light of the Avoidance 
Canon. If this argument is correct, then judicial insistence on one or another should not 




  My goal here has been to explore the meaning and validity of the principal 
provision governing occupational safety standards in the United States. Remarkably, 
Congress’ sole guidance has been to tell the Secretary of Labor to do whatever is 
“reasonably necessary or appropriate” to provide safe and healthful places of 
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employment. The leading court of appeals decision upholds this provision on the ground 
that the agency has developed subsidiary policy by which to limit its own discretion. 
After American Trucking, however, this route is unavailable.    
  In these circumstances, courts have three options. The most aggressive is to 
invalidate the statute on constitutional grounds. Notwithstanding its disruptive potential, 
this route does not entirely lack appeal. Congress should be expected to do much better 
than to instruct the Secretary of Labor to do what he deems “reasonably necessary or 
appropriate.” Invalidation of the statute might well have a democracy-forcing function, 
one that would spur a degree of national deliberation about how best to protect American 
workers from hazards faced in the workplace. Such deliberation could well produce a 
greatly improved statute, one that would benefit from a great deal of theoretical and 
empirical work since OSHA was first enacted.
151 And however aggressive, this approach 
would be less radical than it might seem. No other federal regulatory statute confers so 
much discretion on federal administrators, at least in any area of such scope, and it is not 
difficult to distinguish OSHA from statutes that the Court has upheld. 
  The least aggressive option, grounded in the Avoidance Canon, is to parse the 
statutory language to create floors and ceilings on agency action. The central argument 
here is that the agency may not regulate trivial risks (as held in American Petroleum); 
must not ignore significant risks; and may not regulate beyond the point of feasibility. 
Thus interpreted, is OSHA unconstitutional? The question is not entirely easy to answer. 
On the one hand, the agency would have a limited band of operation; the floors and 
ceilings would reduce its room to maneuver. And if this interpretation were taken to ban 
the agency from making its decisions on the basis of cost-benefit analysis, then the 
problem would be close enough to that in American Trucking. The problem is that at a 
minimum, the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language seems to permit the 
agency to base its decisions on cost-benefit analysis if that is what it seeks to do. The 
question then becomes: If the agency is given the discretion to choose between (a) cost-
benefit analysis or (b) an approach based on significant risk/feasibility, is there a 
violation of the nondelegation doctrine? Probably not, but reasonable people might 
disagree about how to answer that question. 
                                                 
151 See notes supra. 
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  The third possibility, also grounded in the Avoidance Canon, would be to 
construe the statute to require some kind of cost-benefit balancing, rooted in a minimal 
requirement of proportionality between costs and benefits. This approach would permit 
the Secretary of Labor to decide exactly what cost-benefit analysis entails in the 
distinctive context of occupational safety – to assign values to mortality and morbidity 
effects and to give significant weight to considerations of equity and fair distribution. 
From a strictly doctrinal point of view, an evident advantage of this approach is that it 
would fit well with the statutory language while also eliminating the constitutional 
problem. And from the standpoint of sound policy, a proportionality requirement would 
also have the virtue of increasing the transparency of occupational safety law -- by 
ensuring, for the first time, that the key choices are explained in a way that is subject to 
public scrutiny and review.
152 
 
                                                 
152 For those who believe that cost-benefit analysis undermines transparency, of course this argument will 
not be convincing. See Lisa Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman, Priceless (2004); for a different view, see 
Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason (2002). 
 